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Abstract 
Quebec’s modern international outlook and its current paradiplomacy can be dated largely 
from the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. Since then, the provincial government in Quebec 
City and the Federal Government in Ottawa have had to tread a fine line in accommodating 
each other’s constitutional rights in the field of international relations—a line that has 
occasionally been breached, especially in the years following the Quiet Revolution and in 
critical periods such as those prior to the 1980 and 1995 referenda. Foreign governments have 
also had to engage in careful diplomacy in order to avoid upsetting either Ottawa or Quebec 
City—and this has been especially true in the case of the countries historically most involved 
with Canada and Quebec—France, the US, and  Britain. But whereas there has been some 
academic writing on Quebec’s relationships with France and the US, very little attention has 
been devoted to Quebec–UK relations since the Quiet Revolution. This article seeks to fill 
that gap and argues that the Quebec–UK relationship since the 1960s can itself best be 
characterized as a “quiet revolution” in diplomacy that has largely avoided the controversies 
that have sometimes dogged Quebec’s relations with France and the US. 
Keywords: Quebec; United Kingdom; Quiet Revolution; patriation; monarchy; 
paradiplomacy  
Introduction 
While diplomatic relations between Quebec and the UK can be dated back to before the First 
World War—the first Quebec legation in London opened in 1908—it was not until the Quiet 
Revolution of the 1960s, associated with Jean Lesage and the Quebec Liberal party, that the 
province began to take full advantage of its international potential. This new approach to 
international policy was spelled out by Lesage’s deputy premier, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, in his 
now famous doctrine of April 1965—i.e., that Quebec’s international relations are “the 
external extension of its domestic fields of jurisdiction” under the British North America Act 
of 1867, since adopted by Canada as the Constitutional Act of 1982. (Michaud 2011, 390–
391). This article will therefore focus on Quebec–UK relations from the election of Jean 
Lesage’s Liberal government in 1960 to the present. In so doing it will argue that it was in the 
quarter-century between 1960 and 1985 that British policymakers radically altered their view 
of Quebec’s political and economic significance and that the contemporary Quebec–UK 
relationship was thereby established. It will further argue that the acid test of this new 
relationship was the so-called “Battle of London” (Bastien 2014)—the patriation of the 
Canadian constitution in 1982 without the consent of Quebec—and that, having survived that 
test, the “quiet revolution” in Quebec–UK relations has been consolidated and embedded 
within the wider Canada–UK relationship. 
The term “quiet revolution” as a description of the evolution of the contemporary 
Quebec–UK relationship is appropriate in three main ways. First, the current Quebec–UK 
relationship mainly resulted from the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. While it was the 
constitutional design of the British North America Act of 1867 that provided the political and 
legal basis for Quebec’s internationalism, it was the new, more progressive and outward 
looking attitude of the Lesage government that gave it birth and it was the Gérin-Lajoie 
doctrine that embedded it in Quebec’s international policy (Michaud 2011). Second, the 
“quiet revolution” in Quebec–UK relations has been relatively unspectacular—in contrast to 
Quebec-France relations since the 1960s—especially De Gaulle’s “l’appel du balcon” during 
his highly controversial visit to Quebec in 1967 (Meren 2013; Thompson 1990) and the 
Gabon issue soon after (Black 1997). The Quebec–US relationship has also witnessed a 
number of flashpoints, notably at the time of the 1995 Referendum (Lemco 1994; Blanchard 
1998; Stewart 2012). Third, the “quiet revolution” in Quebec–UK diplomacy has gone 
largely unnoticed—as can be seen in the paucity of historical writing on Quebec–UK 
relations since 1960 either in Canada or in the UK, apart from within the wider context of 
Canada–UK relations (Painchaud 1977; Head and Trudeau 1995; Eldridge 1997) or of 
Quebec’s paradiplomacy (Balthazar 1999; McHugh 2015; Ouimet 2015). While there is some 
academic writing on the Quebec–US relationship and especially on the Quebec–France 
relationship, there is very little on Quebec–UK relations (e.g. Nossal 2012, 315–331). 
The Ancien Regime —the era of Duplessis, 1944–1959 
In order to appreciate the transformation in Quebec’s international outlook since the 1960s, 
and in the consequent change in the British government’s attitude towards Quebec, it is first 
necessary to examine the perspectives of the Quebec and UK governments during the 
Duplessis era that preceded the Quiet Revolution. Maurice Duplessis, the leader of the Union 
Nationale party, first became premier of Quebec in August 1936 and soon after he closed the 
Quebec Government House in London on economic grounds (Balthazar, 1999). He was also 
opposed to any involvement in the League of Nations or any action on behalf of Britain and 
France against the rising power of Hitler’s Germany. Defeated in the Quebec election of 
October 1939, he returned to power in August 1944 largely as a result of the widespread 
opposition in Quebec to wartime conscription (Nish, 1970; Black, 1998). Duplessis retained 
power until his death in 1959, partly through a strong emphasis on Quebec nationalism—one 
example of which was the adoption of the Fleurdelisé as the flag of Quebec in January 
1948—and partly because of the support of the Roman Catholic Church with its emphasis on 
traditional values against what was seen as the radicalism and anti-clericalism of the Quebec 
Liberals. The Duplessis regime also acquired an unenviable reputation for electoral 
corruption, which no doubt helps to explain its longevity (Nish 1970; Black 1998). 
The Dominions Office in London and its successor from 1947, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, certainly regarded the Duplessis regime as backward-looking and corrupt. 
When, in September 1954, Canadian Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, himself a 
French Canadian, attacked Duplessis as a reactionary who was stirring up Quebec 
nationalism to keep control of the province to the detriment of Quebec and the rest of 
Canada, a Commonwealth Relations Office official commented: “The French-Canadian, long 
since cut off from any ties with France, is by nature an isolationist imbued with the sense of a 
vital need to defend his language, religion and culture from being submerged in the powerful 
English-speaking world around him. Any suggestions of Federal grants to the provinces for, 
say, education, roads or other matters under provincial control, is viewed suspiciously as an 
attempt by the Federal Government to gain some control over the affairs of the provinces.” 
Duplessis was characterized by this British official as “Canada’s most controversial 
Provincial Premier and an aggressive guardian of Provincial autonomy.” He was also seen as 
“militantly anti-communist,” deriving his main support from Quebec’s farming communities 
“to whom he extends many preferences.”1       
The motive behind the Duplessis strategy was regarded in London as a desire for 
political autonomy for his province rather than concern for its economic well-being. But 
when provincial elections were held in July 1956, Duplessis and the Union Nationale were 
once again victorious, winning the vast majority of seats in the Quebec National Assembly. 
There were widespread reports of vote-rigging and corruption after the election which 
seemed to confirm, as reported by the British High Commission in Ottawa, the “dark 
suspicion that politics in Quebec were dirtier than elsewhere in Canada.” The general 
standards of election campaigns in the province were considered to be very low but 
“whatever is wrong with political morality in Quebec, it can hardly be denied that it is the 
Union Nationale Party which has profited most conspicuously from the present situation.”2     
Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution 
The death of Duplessis in September 1959 and of his successor as premier, Paul Sauvé, in 
January 1960, was followed that June by elections that brought to power the Quebec Liberal 
party led by Jean Lesage. The Quebec Liberals had been out of office since August 1944 but 
were elected with 51 percent of the popular vote and 51 seats compared with 43 for the Union 
Nationale (Thompson, 1984). As well as domestic reforms involving education, 
secularization and the ownership of natural resources, the new government set out to enhance 
Quebec’s standing with the rest of Canada and the world. Quebec’s international profile had 
already been raised by the visit of the president of France, Charles De Gaulle, in April 1960 
(Thompson 1988; Meren 2013). In March 1961, a Ministry of Federal–Provincial Relations 
was established which later took over international relations as well. It was renamed the 
Ministry of Inter–Governmental Affairs in April 1967, retitled in December 1984 as the 
Ministry of International Relations (MRI),  named in 2012 as the Ministry of International 
Relations, La Francophonie and External Trade (Quebec Government 2015a), and finally, in 
2014, shortened to the Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie. 
Anxious to engage with the international community, Lesage’s government 
established legations in Paris and London, and upgraded the New York legation that had been 
set up in 1940. Lesage arranged to visit France in October 1961 to open the Quebec legation 
and he also planned to stop off in London on the way, from September 19–22. News of this 
visit created some consternation in Whitehall in terms of correct diplomatic protocol. On the 
one hand, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa recommended giving him special 
treatment, writing  that “Lesage is outstanding among the Premiers and has been tipped by 
many as the ultimate choice of the Liberal Party for their national leader and as a possible 
future Prime Minister of Canada.” On the other hand, the Commonwealth Relations Office 
felt that the arrangements for his visit should be left to Canada House and that if he was given 
special treatment it would have to be given to other provincial leaders arriving from Canada 
and elsewhere.3    
Lesage’s visit to London proved to be a relatively low-key affair, although he met 
some government officials at a lunch organized by the Canadian High Commission. This was 
in stark contrast to the attention lavished on him in Paris, where—as the Commonwealth 
Relations Office ruefully noted—he was greeted by President de Gaulle like a head of state, 
and even in Rome, where he was treated as an international celebrity. This diplomatic 
embarrassment caused British—and Canadian—officials to rethink their attitude toward visits 
by Quebec leaders, and when Lesage planned to return to London in October 1962 to open 
the Quebec legation in the UK, it was decided to make more of an effort to receive him. In 
fact, Lesage’s visit had to be canceled because of the Quebec elections that were called for 
November 1962, effectively postponing Lesage’s return to London until May 1963. By this 
time his party had not only been convincingly re-elected in Quebec, but he had also played a 
major role in the return to power of the federal Liberals under Lester Pearson in April 1963.4     
Thus, when he visited London in May 1963, Lesage received VIP treatment from both 
Canada House and the British government. This included a luncheon party hosted by the 
Duke of Devonshire, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations; a call on the 
Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys; tea at the Mansion House with the Lord Mayor of 
London; an audience with the Queen; and a meeting with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. 
He also met various business leaders—an important part of his agenda as one of the main 
aims of his visit was “a mission to put Quebec on the map in an industrial way and end the 
Province’s tendency for isolation.”5   
The highlight of Lesage’s visit was the official opening of Quebec Government House 
on May 7, accompanied by Agent General Hughes Lapointe, who had been appointed in 
January 1962. It was obviously an emotional occasion for the Quebec premier and he began 
his speech by saying a few words in French. He then explained to the assembled dignitaries 
what it meant for Quebec to have an international policy. The aim, he said, was for Quebec 
“to be present,” to be part of the larger community both in Canada and beyond. By raising 
Quebec’s international profile other countries would see for themselves what Quebec had to 
offer in terms of natural resources, business, tourism and culture. Pointing to the valuable 
work already being done by the Quebec agencies in Paris and New York, Lesage said that he 
was convinced that the new agency in London would be just as valuable. “We are confident,” 
he said, “that it will render great service to our province, and serve to strengthen the ties of 
friendship between the British people and Canadians in general and Quebecers in particular.” 
(The Times May 10, 1963). 
While he was in London, Lesage played down the recent formation of the Front de 
Libération du Québec (FLQ) which became notorious in the 1960s for its regular bombings 
that killed several people and injured many others. Equally embarrassing for the international 
image of Quebec, especially in the UK, were the troubles that took place during the Queen’s 
visit on October 10, 1964, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Quebec Conference 
on Canadian confederation, when violence between police and separatists became known as 
“Samedi de la Matraque”—“the Saturday of the Baton” (Le Devoir October 11, 1964; 
Montreal Gazette October 11, 1964; The Times October 11, 1964).  
Because of the over-representation of rural constituencies in Quebec, the Lesage 
government was defeated in the general election of June 1966, although it obtained a much 
larger number of votes than the traditionalist Union Nationale party that took power, having 
campaigned on the slogan of “Equality or Independence.” Daniel Johnson, who was the 
Quebec premier from June 1966 to September 1968, paid an official visit to France in May 
1967, where he was received with much ceremony by President de Gaulle. He was also due 
to meet Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London, but this had to be canceled owing—it was 
said—to insufficient time. In July 1967 De Gaulle paid a return visit to Quebec and visited 
the Montreal Expo. It was on this occasion that he made his controversial “Vive le Québec 
libre” speech to the huge crowd that had gathered to see him in Montreal (Thompson 1988; 
Meren 2013). 
The October Crisis, 1970  
The Liberals returned to power in May 1970 under the leadership of Robert Bourassa and 
soon found themselves dealing with a major crisis that threatened Quebec’s relations not only 
with the rest of Canada but especially with the UK. This was the so-called October crisis 
when the FLQ kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross, and Quebec Minister of 
Labour Pierre Laporte. This resulted in Bourassa calling on the Federal Government led by 
Pierre Trudeau to invoke the War Measures Act in order that the Quebec government could 
adopt emergency powers for use against the FLQ, including the suspension of habeas 
corpus—a step announced by Trudeau on October 16 (English 2009). The next day the FLQ 
revealed that Laporte had been executed and that Cross would not be released until its 
demands had been met, including the publication of the FLQ manifesto, the release of FLQ 
“political prisoners,” and safe passage for Cross’s kidnappers to Cuba or Algeria. Eventually, 
after 62 days in captivity, Cross was released unharmed on December 3, 1970. At the same 
time, five FLQ kidnappers were flown to Cuba (McRoberts 1999; Tetley 2007; Bouthillier 
and Clouthier 2010). 
In the wake of this crisis, Sir Peter Hayman, the British High Commissioner in 
Ottawa, produced a report for London titled “A New Look at Quebec,” which gave a 
comprehensive review of the current state of affairs in the province.6 Acknowledging that the 
issue of Quebec was not a new one, he argued that what he called “the Canadian 
kaleidoscope” had been sufficiently shaken by the events of 1970 so as to justify a fresh 
examination of the UK’s relationship with the province. “The French Canadians in Quebec 
possess most, if not all, of the attributes of nationhood,” he wrote. “They have their 
distinctive language, culture, history, geography and substantial economic resources. They 
have, too, an enemy of sorts in the English Canadians (quite apart from the pressure on their 
language and culture from the United States). ... They lack only political independence. 
Hitherto defensive, inbred, introverted, and deeply suspicious of modern trends and 
developments, the Quebecois were emancipated in the early ’60s by a dynamic and 
progressive Liberal government under Lesage. The result is a young nation bursting with a 
mixture of new confidence and lingering self-doubt, seeking to assert itself more positively in 
the Canadian scene and perhaps prepared, if all else fails, to opt out of Canada.”  
Under the Union Nationale government between 1966 and 1970 Quebec had lost its 
sense of direction, Hayman argued, but Bourassa and the Liberals now had the chance to put 
Quebec back on course. Bourassa’s main problems lay in the economic field. He had won the 
election essentially on bread and butter issues and had made much of his promise to create 
100,000 new jobs by the end of 1971. At the time of his election things looked bleak for 
Quebec—about 40 percent of Canada’s unemployed were in Quebec, especially in Montreal. 
Clearly there was no quick or easy answer to this, wrote Hayman. Bourassa’s drive to 
encourage investment had not solved the short term problems of Quebec and the October 
crisis had “shattered the confidence of the province and of the rest of Canada.” The 
unemployment situation in Quebec was now worse than in 1970—10 percent in Quebec in 
January 1971 compared with a national figure of 8.1 percent. Most federal aid was going to 
Quebec but there was a limit to how much the Federal Government could do without 
upsetting the other provinces.  
 “What are Britain’s interests in this complex situation?” Hayman’s report continued. 
“It was greatly in Britain’s political and commercial interest that Canada should remain 
united, strong and capable of remaining independent of the United States,” he said. “We 
should not of course involve ourselves directly in the Quebec problem; nor, on the other 
hand, should we deal only with the Anglophone provinces. In fact, while strictly observing 
the Federal proprieties, we should treat Quebec exactly as we do other provinces—solely in 
accordance with our assessment of its importance to us commercially or in any other way.” 
Above all, he concluded, “we must keep a very wary eye on future developments in Quebec. 
We must continue to hope that all will be well, but I believe it is no longer inevitable that the 
province will remain part of Canada in the long run.”7    
Robert Bourassa visits to UK, 1971 and 1972 
Not surprisingly in view of Hayman’s memo and Bourassa’s role in the October crisis, when 
the Quebec premier arrived in London he received VIP treatment, including a meeting with 
British Prime  Minister Edward Heath. A briefing note for Heath prior to his meeting with 
Bourassa stressed his federalist credentials and the fact that the Canadian government was 
keen for him to be well received. “The principal objective of M Bourassa’s tour is to attract 
new investment to Quebec as a means of fulfilling his election pledge to create 100,000 new 
jobs in the Province” the memo stated. “On his success in doing so may depend not only the 
future of his own Government but, possibly, the continued unity of Canada as a Federal State. 
It is in Britain’s interest that Canadian stability and unity should be preserved both because of 
our considerable economic stake in the country and because Canada’s contribution to the 
Western Alliance could be affected if she were faced with prolonged internal disorder or if 
Quebec were to break away.”8      
At the meeting with Heath on April 14, 1971, discussion centered mainly on 
economic matters and Bourassa explained that unemployment in Quebec, and a rise in the 
numbers looking for work because of an increased birth rate, made it imperative for Quebec 
to expand its industrial investment and that this needed to be done at a rate higher than the 
province’s own resources would permit. This was the rationale for his present European tour. 
Bourassa also said that the extreme separatist movement in Quebec was under control and 
that, with economic prosperity and a guarantee of cultural security, separatism would lose its 
appeal. In his view, it did not make sense for Quebec, with its current economic problems, to 
aim for separatism when throughout the world the movement was towards greater economic 
unity.9 
Bourassa made another visit to the UK the following year, ostensibly to attend and 
speak at a Canada–US investment symposium that was taking place in London from 
November 28–30, 1972. During this trip, he also met Heath again as well as Wilson, the 
leader of the opposition, and various government ministers and officials. At his meeting with 
Heath, Bourassa said that it was of comparatively small importance as far as Canadian unity 
was concerned whether the Liberals or Conservatives were in power in Ottawa. The crucial 
question was whether the Liberal Party or the Parti Québécois—formed in 1968—would win 
at the next provincial general election. He felt that the PQ’s idea of separation followed by 
monetary union between an independent Quebec and Canada made no sense and he 
compared such a situation with Europe where he believed that there could be no monetary 
union without economic union. Bourassa also invited Heath to visit Quebec on his next trip to 
Canada, to which Heath expressed interest and appreciation but made no commitment.10   
Visit of James Callaghan to Quebec, 1976 
In fact, Heath did not visit Canada again as prime minister and nor did his successor, Harold 
Wilson, who became prime minister in February 1974. However, a Canadian visit was made 
by Wilson’s successor, James Callaghan, in September 1976, which included a private lunch 
with Bourassa in Quebec City. Bourassa brought up the thorny issue of Quebec’s position 
under the terms of the British North America Act of 1867 by asking Callaghan if he would 
promise not to amend the  act, or transfer it to the Canadian government—patriation, as it was 
known—unless all the provinces, and especially Quebec, agreed (Granatstein and Bothwell 
1990, 341). The British prime minister, who had no doubt been warned to expect this request 
by Pierre Trudeau (who was keen to tackle the patriation issue), told Bourassa that he could 
make no such commitment. The British government’s relations were with the Federal 
Government, he said, and the UK would have to agree to any request made by the Canadian 
parliament.11  
René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in power 
Callaghan’s blunt rejection of his approach was a bitter blow for Bourassa but worse was to 
follow. He and the Liberals were steadily losing public support in Quebec and the elections 
that took place in November 1976 resulted in a landslide victory for René Lévesque and the 
Parti Québécois, including the loss of Bourassa’s own seat. In 1978, he was replaced as 
Liberal Leader by Claude Ryan, former editor of Le Devoir (Lévesque 1986; McRoberts 
1999). Lévesque, who had been a member of Jean Lesage’s Liberal government, had quit the 
party in 1967 and helped to form the PQ. He was an outspoken critic of Trudeau and was 
known for “shooting from the hip” during interviews and press conferences. When asked 
about the Queen at a press conference in 1971, he had said: “I have great respect for the 
Queen as she is the Queen of Great Britain which is a respectable country” but, he added, 
“what the hell role should she have in Quebec—or in Canada for that matter?” (CBC Digital 
archives 1971). 
On becoming the premier of Quebec, Lévesque pursued a more diplomatic line on 
independence, focusing primarily on the need for good government. This strategy appeared to 
meet with some success and it was a worried Trudeau who met for dinner with James 
Callaghan at 10 Downing Street on December 7, 1978. Trudeau told the British prime 
minister that Canada was facing a grave crisis. An independent Quebec would be disastrous 
economically for the Québécois since independence could lead only to increased economic 
domination by the United States. Moreover, Quebec, with one-third of Canada’s population, 
was essential to the continued existence of the country. If Canada fell apart then the continent 
would be dominated by one superpower, stretching from the Mexican border to the Arctic 
Circle. Trudeau added that the English Canadians needed to realize that Quebec would only 
be happy in a confederation if she felt at home in it. Otherwise Lévesque might succeed in 
persuading the province to opt for independence.12       
Trudeau had other problems apart from Quebec—his popularity had waned and his 
party faced defeat at the next election. In May 1979 the general election in fact resulted in a 
defeat for the Liberals—despite winning the largest share of the vote—and a Progressive 
Conservative minority government under Joe Clark. Trudeau announced his resignation but 
when Clark’s government lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, another 
general election took place and Trudeau was back as prime minister in February 1980—just 
in time for the referendum that Lévesque had promised in Quebec, which was scheduled for 
November 15, 1980 (McRoberts 1999; English 2009). Like the October crisis 10 years 
before, the referendum debate and the very real possibility that Quebec might eventually vote 
for independence led British officials in Canada to discuss the likely consequences for the 
UK if Quebec seceded. In particular, in March 1980, John Rich, the British consul general in 
Montreal, produced a significant discussion paper about British policy in the event of Quebec 
independence.  
 “Clearly it is important for Britain that Canada, our Commonwealth and NATO 
partner, should remain strong and united,” wrote Rich. “Conversely, it is not in our interest 
that the ‘Quebec problem’ should be a running sore which becomes worse rather than better 
and consequently weakens the Atlantic Community to a degree disproportionate to its 
intrinsic importance.” After initial trouble of adjusting its economy if the economic union 
with the rest of Canada were dissolved, Rich believed that “an independent Quebec would be 
a viable state on the scale of the Scandinavian countries and play a responsible role in the 
international community. The real problem would be the future of the rest of Canada, most 
particularly Ontario and the Maritimes.” However, despite his forebodings, Rich felt that 
separation would be avoided. “I base this on the instinctive caution and common sense of the 
French Canadian in the street which counter-balances nationalist enthusiasm, providing that 
his indignation is not over-provoked,” he said. “But we cannot bank on this. Looking to the 
future we have to handle our affairs in Quebec in such a way that specific British interests are 
well promoted whichever way things turn out.”   
As Rich noted, Britain held quite a few cards if Quebec were to become independent. 
Apart from the fact that the UK was Quebec’s second-largest export market, British 
investment in Quebec, the desire for an exchange of experience and know-how in many 
different fields of life, and to diversify friendships and relationships was also significant, as 
was the similarity of their parliamentary systems. According to Rich, there were no major 
bilateral problems affecting British relations with the Quebec government. Britain was liked 
and respected. “Modern French Quebecers are learning to distinguish the difference between 
the British of Britain and Anglo-Canadians,” Rich wrote. “They are increasingly re-
discovering Britain and like what they find. We cannot, however, take the French Canadians 
for granted. In our relationships the ground, fertile though it is, needs to be diligently 
cultivated.”  
“All this means,” concluded Rich,” that British representation ... has a job of 
substance to do in Quebec, building upon already favorable foundations with an eye to the 
future whichever way the constitutional issue finally turns out. The City of Montreal and the 
Province of Quebec are stimulating and agreeable places in which to work, and I have found 
the French Canadians to be perhaps the most responsive of any people I know to effort made 
in their direction. ... My successors, whether they are called Consul-General, High 
Commissioner or Ambassador, and whether they reside in Montreal or Quebec City, are 
assured of a rewarding appointment.”13   
Sir John Ford, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, also wrote his own paper for 
London in which he was less optimistic than Rich about the future of Canadian unity and 
very concerned that the return of Trudeau would play into the hands of Lévesque and the PQ. 
“At present, for want of any clearly visible and unifying threat from outside, it seems as if 
Canada’s politicians are being borne remorselessly along by the tide of Quebec nationalism: 
this points to the ultimate secession of the province,” he wrote. “Yet, if that happens, it need 
not be disastrous to Quebec or our interests.” Ford argued that Canada under Trudeau’s 
leadership was not punching its weight internationally. “It is not inconceivable,” he 
continued, “that a strong and independent Quebec could be comparable as an ally within 
NATO to, for example, Norway or Denmark; although the United States would have to 
accept traumatic adjustments both to NORAD and to the control and administration of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway.” Much would depend, he thought, on the circumstances of the secession 
and whether “the ill-will generated thereby was such as to sour for years Quebec’s 
relationship with the rest of Canada and to make her an awkward partner in the defence of the 
North Atlantic.”14  
The Patriation of the Canadian Constitution, 1982 
In any event, the referendum proposal put forward by Lévesque was defeated - 60% of the 
electorate voting “No” against 40 percent voting “Yes.” This was not the end of the issue, of 
course, but the result encouraged Trudeau to proceed with his own constitutional package—
the patriation of the Canadian Constitution including a Charter of Rights that would codify 
common law rights, recognize the treaty rights of indigenous peoples, and establish a 
domestic amending formula, i.e., one that would be under Canadian control. Patriation 
essentially meant that the process of amending the Canadian Constitution (i.e., the former 
British North America Act of 1867 and the new Charter of Rights) would, in future, reside in 
Canada rather than in Britain. The exact details were controversial, however, because the 
rights of the provinces were involved which is why Bourassa had raised the subject with 
Callaghan in Quebec City in September 1976 and urged him to oppose Trudeau’s version of 
patriation if it was not accepted by all of the provinces, including Quebec.  
Lévesque and his ministers now raised the patriation issue with Ford and his officials 
in December 1980. Lévesque pointed out that Trudeau’s proposals were being challenged by 
several provinces, including his own. Quebec’s objection was based on an analysis of the 
1867 British North America Act taken in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the 
Statute of Westminster of 1931, which had officially recognized the equal status of Britain 
and the Dominions within the Empire. The PQ’s view was that the Federal Government 
should not be allowed to override provisions in the 1867 Act prohibiting it from interference 
in matters of provincial jurisdiction. According to the minutes of the meeting, the PQ 
ministers “expressed the hope that the British Parliament should not act supinely by merely 
accepting demands placed upon it by the Canadian Federal Parliament. Then, as later, Sir 
John Ford stressed the need for Canadians to reconcile their own differences before the 
Constitutional issue was transferred to Westminster.” Lévesque thought that “Trudeau would 
continue to place great importance on the obligation of the British Parliament to meet any 
Federal requirement.”15      
 Lévesque was correct. In September 1981, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled 
that the Federal Government did have the power to proceed with patriation without 
the consent of the provinces but that it would be desirable to obtain their consent. It 
seemed unlikely that Trudeau would get even a majority of the provinces to agree to 
patriation but ultimately Lévesque was outmaneuvered in what was labelled as the 
“Night of Long Knives”—a succession of one-on-one and small group meetings 
throughout the night of November 4–5, 1981, as a result of which, Trudeau reached a 
deal with nine other provinces to repatriate the Constitution, including the Charter of 
Rights. Quebec was not a party to these meetings and tried to block their outcome, but 
to no avail (Graham 2011). 
A resolution of the Canadian Parliament was then conveyed to Queen 
Elizabeth II who, on April 17, 1982, acting on the advice of the UK Government, 
proclaimed the Constitution Act of 1982. While accepting the Canadian Parliament’s 
request, the British government was privately aghast at Trudeau’s methods and the 
way he had placed it in an invidious position. The British were very aware of the 
opposition in Canada to Trudeau’s proposals—not just from Quebec—and there was 
some disquiet within Westminster at the turn of events. But in the end the 
constitutional convention of acceding to the wishes of the Canadian Parliament 
outweighed all other considerations (Hughes 2013; Bastien 2014).  
Lévesque’s frustration with the British government over its acceptance of the 
Constitution may explain why he did not include the UK in his European tour in June/July 
1982. He eventually visited London in April 1984. “Quebec still has a ‘sour after-taste’ about 
the way the Canadian Constitution was ‘rubber stamped’ by your mother of parliaments,” he 
told the Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce, in what one newspaper described as “a 
humorous but often barbed speech.” Indeed, “the Premier made no effort to play down either 
the continuing Ottawa-Quebec differences or his party’s long-term goal of Quebec 
independence.” But he was keen to attract British investment to Quebec and this outweighed 
his annoyance with the British Government, although a meeting with Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher was noticeably missing from his trip. He pointed out to his business 
audience that Britain was Quebec’s second-most important trade market after the United 
States and, anxious to reassure British investors, he concluded his speech by saying that if 
Quebec finally decided to leave Canada, there would be even greater potential for economic 
development (Montreal Gazette, April 18, 1984; Le Devoir, April 18, 1984). Lévesque’s one 
and only visit to the UK as premier of Quebec was thus a reassuringly positive occasion—
despite the “sour after-taste” of the patriation episode. Also reassuring from a British point of 
view was the PQ’s publication of its eminently sensible and moderate international policy—
Quebec in the World—in the following year (Quebec Government 1985).  
In October 1985, Lévesque retired as premier and was replaced by Pierre-Marc 
Johnson, the son of Daniel Johnson, the Union Nationale premier of Quebec from 1966 to 
1968. In December, the PQ was on the receiving end of a landslide victory by the Quebec 
Liberals, making Johnson the shortest serving premier in Quebec’s history. Robert Bourassa, 
the great survivor of Quebec politics, returned once more as premier, almost 10 years after 
his crushing defeat at the hands of Lévesque and the PQ in 1976 (McRoberts 1999; Brault 
2011; Georges-Hebe 2012). Bourassa’s return marked the end of a critical phase in Quebec–
UK relations from 1960 to 1985. The relationship had weathered the Quiet Revolution, the 
October Crisis, the advent of the Parti Québécois, the Referendum of 1980 and, above all, the 
patriation of the Constitution in 1982 and the ire of René Lévesque. 
The 1995 Referendum 
In the quarter century since Lévesque’s retirement, Quebec–UK relations have remained on a 
sound footing with little to disturb them apart from the periodic issue of Quebec separatism.  
During the second premiership of Bourassa from 1985 to 1994, the British Government 
remained an interested but neutral observer—in public at least—while the constitutional 
wrangles associated with the Meech Lake Accord brokered by Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney in 1987 worked their way through the Canadian political system. Bourassa visited 
London again in January 1989 and met Margaret Thatcher—“La Dame de fer” as Le Devoir 
called her (Montreal Gazette January 20, 1989; Le Devoir January 20, 1989). The main 
feature of the Quebec–UK relationship continued to be the economic one, as Bourassa’s talks 
with Thatcher made clear. As ever, he came seeking British investment in Quebec and was 
also concerned about the impact of the European Union on Quebec’s trading position. He 
retired in January 1994 to be replaced by Daniel Johnson Jr., the son and brother of former 
premiers of Quebec (Brault 2011; Georges-Hebe 2012). 
In September 1994, Johnson and the Quebec Liberals were defeated in the provincial 
elections and the PQ once again formed a government, this time under Jacques Parizeau. The 
failure to ratify either the Meech Lake Accord of April 1987 or the subsequent Charlottetown 
accord of August 1992, both of which had aimed to recognize Quebec’s distinctive place 
within Canada, had revived the separatist movement within the province and led to a second 
referendum in October 1995 in which some 60 percent of Francophone voters supported 
separation but which was narrowly defeated by a total vote of 49.42 percent in favor and 
50.58 percent against (Chrétien 2007; Hérbert and Lapierre 2014). Once again UK officials in 
Canada were careful to avoid any public involvement in the issue and similarly British 
ministers and officials in London adopted strict neutrality in public, mindful, as in 1980, that 
the top priority was for the British relationship with both Canada and Quebec to continue in 
an amicable way regardless of the outcome of the referendum (Bayne 2010 and 2014).  
This is not to say that the British government was unconcerned at the prospect of a 
separatist majority in the referendum which, it was feared, would have serious repercussions 
for both Quebec and the rest of Canada, especially economically and strategically. Indeed, the 
British view was that Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien, had been far too complacent in his 
attitude towards the referendum and on October 28, shortly before the referendum vote, the 
British High Commissioner in Ottawa, Sir Nicholas Bayne, met with Chrétien and read out a 
message from British Prime Minister John Major expressing concern at the prospect of a 
“yes” vote (Bayne 2014).  
British diplomacy during the referendum debate was very different, in public at least, 
from that of France and the United States. As regards the former, it was widely assumed that 
French President Jacques Chirac, was ready to give immediate official recognition to Quebec 
as a sovereign state if the “Yes” campaign emerged triumphant after the referendum vote 
(Bosher 1998; Bastien 1999; Herbert and Lapierre 2014). US diplomacy, on the other hand, 
worked in the opposite direction as Washington made it clear that it much preferred that 
Canada should remain intact and indicated that an independent Quebec would not 
automatically be given the benefits accruing to Canada from the recently negotiated NAFTA 
agreement (Blanchard 1998; Stewart 2012). 
With the defeat of the referendum, which he blamed on “money and the ethnic vote,”  
Parizeau resigned as premier and was succeeded in January 1996 by Lucien Bouchard, who 
had led the “Yes” campaign during the referendum and very nearly achieved victory. 
Bouchard had been the Canadian ambassador in Paris (1985–1988), a member of Brian 
Mulroney’s Conservative Federal Government, and one of the founders of the Bloc 
Québécois. Perhaps not surprisingly, Bouchard did not visit the UK as premier but he did 
travel to France in September 1997 for a five-day visit that was much commented upon as an 
indication of a “special relationship” with France that continued to test the constitutional 
limits of the PQ government’s international ambitions. Bouchard was accompanied by his 
deputy and minister for economic affairs, Bernard Landry; his minister of culture, Louise 
Beaudoin, and his minister for international relations, Sylvain Simard. During the visit 
Bouchard met with French President Chirac, and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, while his 
colleagues met with their counterparts. To some observers, the event resembled an official 
state visit, with Quebec's délégation générale in Paris acting “almost as the embassy of a 
sovereign state” (The Economist September 25, 1997). 
Bouchard’s successor, Bernard Landry, who became premier in March 2001, came to 
London in October 2002 as part of the delegation that celebrated the 40th anniversary of the 
opening of Quebec Government House. It was also during Landry’s premiership that a 
Quebec–British Council agreement was signed in April 2002 to promote cooperation in the 
three key areas of education, culture and science and technology. This agreement 
incorporated a language assistant exchange program originating in 1980 under which 60 
citizens from Quebec and Britain were to be selected each year to work as teaching assistants 
in French or English in Quebec and the United Kingdom (Quebec Government 2015b).   
Thus Quebec–UK relations remained cordial but they were less close than Quebec’s 
relationship with France which was underpinned by official visits to Paris and Quebec in 
alternate years (Quebec Government 2015c). The French government’s opposition to the 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was also more in tune with public opinion in Quebec than the 
support given to President George W. Bush by the British government. On March 15, 2003, 
only a few days before the beginning of hostilities, a crowd of 200,000 people took part in a 
“walk for peace” in Montreal and similar marches were organized in other cities in Quebec—
as indeed they were in Paris, London and New York (Montreal Gazette, March 15, 2003; Le 
Devoir, March 15, 2003).  
Working in Concert, 2006 
In April 2003, the Quebec Liberals returned to power led by Jean Charest who had been a 
member of Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government and one of only two PC 
survivors (indeed, briefly leader of the party) in the federal election of October 1993. Charest 
held office until September 2012 and brought a renewed sense of direction to the agenda of 
the Quebec Liberal Party, including international relations. In May 2006 “Working in 
Concert”—Quebec’s new international policy—was published. Its emphasis on relations with 
the US was readily apparent and not surprising. In the preceding year the United States had 
accounted for over 80 percent of Quebec’s exports (compared with 10 percent to Europe), 73 
percent of its inward investment (22 percent from Europe) and two-thirds of its 3.3 million 
tourists (one-fifth from Europe). Second in importance to the US was France, because of the 
close political and cultural relationship that had been developed since the premiership of Jean 
Lesage. The bilateral relationship with the UK also received several honorable mentions such 
as the statement that “Quebec’s historic and institutional ties with the UK generate important 
economic, scientific and cultural exchanges, which it hopes to expand.” Indeed, Quebec’s 
exports to the UK remained much greater than those to France—but a long way behind those 
to the USA (Quebec Government 2006). 
The historic and institutional links between Quebec and the UK mentioned in the 
2006 international policy document were much in evidence during the Charest premiership. 
For example, on December 17, 2008, the British High Commissioner to Canada, Anthony 
Cary, gave the President of the National Assembly and the Minister of International Relations 
a facsimile of the Quebec Act of 1774, as a gift from the British government to commemorate 
Quebec City’s 400th anniversary. In November 2008, a group of MPs from the Scottish 
Parliament visited Quebec and in April 2009, Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament  
Alex Fergusson marked Tartan Day with a visit to Quebec’s National Assembly (Quebec 
Government 2015b). 
The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall made an official visit to Canada in 
November 2009 during which they spent a day in Montreal and were received by Mayor 
Gerald Tremblay and by Premier Charest. They visited the city’s Biodome, headquarters for 
Cirque de Soleil, and there was also an official dinner. Bloc Québécois leader Gilles Duceppe 
declined an invitation to the dinner saying that he did not approve of the monarchy’s position 
in the Canadian constitution or of the expense to taxpayers in Canada—and especially 
Quebec—of the royal visit. There was also a sizeable demonstration of about 150 protesters 
against the monarchy at the Black Watch armory where Prince Charles, as Colonel in Chief, 
presented the regiment with its colors (Le Devoir November 11, 2009; Montreal Gazette 
November 11, 2009; The Times November 11, 2009).  
In June 2011, Charest visited London at the start of a five-day visit to Europe and the 
UK to promote the newly launched Plan Nord. In a speech to a large audience of business and 
financial leaders he affirmed: “We have rich and diverse relations with the United Kingdom. 
The Government of Québec wants to promote the Plan Nord with its main partners first, those 
with which it has strong ties” (Quebec Government, 2011). During his trip, Charest also met 
with key UK government figures including Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary 
William Hague and Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change Chris Huhne. He also 
had talks with President and CEO of the Climate Group Mark Kenber (Quebec Government, 
2011). 
In the following month, there was an official royal visit to Quebec by the Duke and 
Duchess of Cambridge—the first such visit since 1964. The itinerary included both Montreal 
and Quebec City and the popularity of William and Kate, representing a new generation of 
British royals, was clearly evident. The only opposition came from a small and well-behaved 
group of demonstrators, apparently belonging to the Quebec Resistance Movement, who 
collected outside an Irish pub a few streets away from the royal party at City Hall. Despite a 
banner referring to the Acadian expulsion of 1755, their spokesman said that they had no bad 
feelings toward the British empire and were more concerned with the future than the past. 
Essentially they wanted an independent Quebec without a monarchy (Le Devoir July 3–4, 
2011; Montreal Gazette July 3–4, 2011; Daily Telegraph July 2–3, 2011). The largely 
trouble-free nature of the visit suggested that any residual resentment against Britain as the 
former colonial ruler of Quebec has all but disappeared and that the Quebec and the UK 
governments were indeed “working in concert.”  
Fifty years of the Quebec–UK relationship in London were celebrated in 2012 by 
commemorating the appointment of the first Agent General to be based in London—Hughes 
Lapointe—in January 1962. In a glossy brochure published for the occasion, the Quebec 
government took the opportunity to underline the significance of its relations with the UK. A 
message from Premier Charest said: “As the Quebec Government Office in London 
celebrates its 50th anniversary, these relations have evolved into a mutually beneficial 
partnership that is strongly reflected in the economic, cultural and institutional sectors. Today 
the United Kingdom is amongst Quebec’s most important European economic partners and 
its capital is a prime export market for Quebec’s culture” (Quebec Government 2012). 
Economic data from Statistics Canada backed up this statement, showing that in 2011 
the UK was Quebec’s main European economic partner and its third largest global trade 
partner, after the United States and China. Trade in goods between Quebec and the United 
Kingdom totaled $5.8 billion; this trade consisted of exports to the UK totaling $1.2 billion 
(6.7 percent of the value of Canada’s exports to the UK) while imports from the United 
Kingdom totaled $4.6 billion (44.4 percent of the value of Canadian imports from the UK). 
The UK was also one of the largest foreign investors in Quebec, with over 128 Quebec-based 
subsidiaries of companies such as Rio Tinto Alcan, Rolls-Royce, and the pharmaceutical 
giant GlaxoSmithKline. Some 50 Quebec companies were reported as having operations in 
the UK, including major players such as Bombardier, CGI, CAE and SNC-Lavalin (Quebec 
Government 2015d). 
PQ interlude, September 2012–April 2014 
The election in September 2012 of a minority PQ government in Quebec under Pauline 
Marois did not signal any radical departure from the essential nature of the Quebec–UK 
relationship. While it is true that during her visit to the UK in January 2013 much more media 
attention was devoted to her trip to Edinburgh than to her time in London—speculation being 
that her meeting with the Scottish first minister and leader of the Scottish National Party, 
Alex Salmond, constituted a “separatist summit,” appeared to be very wide of the mark. It 
was noticeable, for example, that the Scottish first minister did not take up Marois’ offer—
made in an interview with a Scottish newspaper, The Herald—to share with him documents 
from the PQ campaign in the 1995 referendum (Globe and Mail, January 28–29, 2013; 
Montreal Gazette, January 28–29, 2013). It was also pointed out by some commentators that 
Scotland had very longstanding links with Canada—for example, Sir John A. Macdonald, 
Canada’s first prime minister was born in Glasgow in January 1815—and that Alex Salmond 
had himself referred to these ancestral links (The Guardian, February 8, 2013).  
Thus, the British government was unlikely to have been too concerned by Marois’ 
visit to Scotland in terms of its implications for Quebec–UK relations. Indeed, the pragmatic 
nature of this relationship is made all the more clear by comparing it to the Quebec–France 
relationship and the attention devoted to the doctrine of “non-ingérence, mais non-
indifférence” (neither interference nor indifference) on the part of France towards Quebec. 
Rather like the so-called “special relationship” between the UK and the United States, the 
attitude of each French president towards Quebec is regularly examined for signs of favor or 
disfavor, as it was during Marois’ visit to France in October 2012, shortly after becoming 
premier. On this occasion she was warmly greeted by Francois Hollande, the new president 
of France, who appeared to be much more sympathetic towards Quebec’s international 
aspirations than his predecessor, Nicholas Sarkozy—a change in the political relationship 
between Quebec and France much discussed in the Quebec press and in the Canadian media 
more generally (Le Devoir October 15, 2012; Globe and Mail October 15, 2013; Le Soleil 
October 15, 2013; National Post October 15, 2013). 
By contrast, the Quebec premier’s focus during her visit to London was very much on 
economic diplomacy and the headline event was her attendance on January 28 at a lunch 
organized by the Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce where she spoke on the subject of 
“Quebec—a thriving economy based on innovation and creativity,”  In a press release at the 
end of the visit she referred in neutral terms to her time in Scotland and the potential for 
developing further economic, social and cultural links. She then said: “The UK is our largest 
foreign trading partner after China and the United States. This visit has enabled us to 
maintain a dialogue with significant partners for our economy and for our development and 
has shown that Quebec offers clear advantages in attracting new investment” (Quebec 
Government 2013a). Her central message was that Quebec was “open for business”—a 
phrase that she repeated several times during her lunchtime address. In order to encourage 
UK business leaders to invest even more in Quebec she also pointed to measures that her 
government had recently taken to encourage foreign investment, including a 10-year tax 
holiday for investments of at least $300 million in certain sectors, and a credit enhancement 
tax in research and development (Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce, March/April 2013). 
The amicable relations between Quebec and the UK were also on show at the reopening of 
Quebec Government House in London in May 2013, presided over by the PQ’s Agent-
General Stéphane Paquet (Quebec Government 2013b). In the same month, one of Quebec’s 
major international companies, Bombardier, announced that it had won a contract with 
Transport for London worth $137 million for train carriages to be built at its factory in Derby 
(Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce June/July 2013). 
Return of the Liberals, April 2014 
In April 2014 the Liberals were returned to power in Quebec, having won 70 seats to 30 for 
the PQ, and formed a majority government led by Philippe Couillard. The new premier led a 
commercial delegation to London in January 2015 and addressed an audience of 200 business 
leaders and decision-makers at Drapers Hall, in the heart of the city, on the theme of 
“Quebec–UK: accelerating trade relations between established partners.” In time-honored 
fashion he called for broader ties with the United Kingdom in terms of trade, investment, 
research, and innovation, pointing out existing synergies in aerospace, information 
technologies, life sciences, and clean technologies. He also presented Quebec’s Plan Nord 
and new Maritime Strategy, centered upon the strategic location of the St. Lawrence Seaway, 
and referred to the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
concluded in August 2014 as a great opportunity to increase trade and investment between 
Quebec and the UK (Quebec Government 2015e; Canada–UK Chamber of Commerce 
Winter/Spring 2015). 
The next day, January 16, he traveled to Wales—possibly by way of contrast with his 
predecessor’s visit to Scotland two years before—and met with First Minister Carwyn Jones, 
before visiting the newly constructed Welsh Parliament Building. He then visited the Life 
Sciences Hub Wales and announced a collaborative partnership between the hub and 
Sherbrooke Innopole, an organization devoted to the promotion of economic development in 
the Sherbrooke area of Quebec. The agreement is intended to encourage the growth of 
innovative firms and the facilitation of exchanges between universities, research institutes, 
and healthcare institutions in Quebec and Wales. Premier Couillard concluded his visit in 
Bridgend, South Wales, where he toured the new CGI security operations center that is due to 
create more than 600 jobs over five years, making it one of the biggest investments in Wales 
in recent times and a good example of Quebec’s entrepreneurial spirit (Quebec Government 
2015e). 
Conclusions 
The quiet revolution in Quebec–UK diplomacy since the 1960s has witnessed the gradual 
emergence of “a very amicable relationship based on mutual respect, political pragmatism 
and economic cooperation”—to quote a recent Quebec Agent-General (Boulanger 2013).  
Mutual respect can be seen in the frequent and trouble-free meetings made by British and 
Quebec leaders and dignitaries to each other’s major cities and commercial centers and the 
warm welcome and ready access accorded to them. Political pragmatism is evident in the 
downplaying of the separatism issue in the years since the 1995 Quebec Referendum and the 
sensitivity of British diplomats to the relationship between the Canadian High Commission 
based at Canada House, Trafalgar Square, and the representatives of the Quebec provincial 
government based at the Quebec delegation near St James Palace—a relationship that is 
especially delicate when there is a PQ government in Quebec City. Finally, economic co-
operation has been a hallmark of the Quebec–UK relationship since the 1960s and can be 
seen not only in the emphasis on commercial priorities when Quebec ministers visit the UK 
but in the very significant trade and investment between Quebec and the UK that has been 
referred to above.  
Underlying the current very positive relationship between Quebec and the UK is a 
gradual shift in focus away from separatism as a divisive issue since the 1995 Referendum, 
not only between Quebec and the rest of Canada but also one affecting friendly foreign states 
such as the US, France and the United Kingdom (Head and Trudeau 1995). Recent provincial 
and federal elections in Quebec—in April 2014 and October 2015 respectively—appear to 
afford strong evidence of the “silent revolution” in Quebec society identified by Jocelyn 
Létourneau whereby the younger generation of Québécois are not primarily interested in the 
colonial past but in a global future in which the English language and the United Kingdom, 
especially as part of the European Union, are likely to be key components (2013). Thus while 
not approaching the political and cultural affinity of the relationship between Quebec and 
France or the current economic and financial significance of Quebec’s relationship with the 
US, the contemporary Quebec–UK  relationship is nevertheless an important one and worthy 
of rather more attention from historians and political scientists than it has tended to be given. 
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